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Abstract
Background: Despite new brain imaging techniques that have improved the study of the underlying processes of
human decision-making, to the best of our knowledge, there have been very few studies that have attempted to
investigate brain activity during medical diagnostic processing. We investigated brain electroencephalography (EEG)
activity associated with diagnostic decision-making in the realm of veterinary medicine using X-rays as a
fundamental auxiliary test. EEG signals were analysed using Principal Components (PCA) and Logistic Regression
Analysis
Results: The principal component analysis revealed three patterns that accounted for 85% of the total variance in
the EEG activity recorded while veterinary doctors read a clinical history, examined an X-ray image pertinent to a
medical case, and selected among alternative diagnostic hypotheses. Two of these patterns are proposed to be
associated with visual processing and the executive control of the task. The other two patterns are proposed to be
related to the reasoning process that occurs during diagnostic decision-making.
Conclusions: PCA analysis was successful in disclosing the different patterns of brain activity associated with
hypothesis triggering and handling (pattern P1); identification uncertainty and prevalence assessment (pattern P3),
and hypothesis plausibility calculation (pattern P2); Logistic regression analysis was successful in disclosing the brain
activity associated with clinical reasoning success, and together with regression analysis showed that clinical
practice reorganizes the neural circuits supporting clinical reasoning.
Keywords: Medical diagnosis, EEG analysis, Brain mapping, Human cognition, Decision-making
Background
The understanding of medical reasoning has been one of
the greatest challenges of medical science, and the investi-
gation of the neural systems responsible for this reasoning
is one of the outmost challenges of neurosciences [1]. The
purpose of this study was to combine theoretical knowledge
about medical reasoning provided by Knowledge-Based
(KBS) and Intelligent Computing Systems (ICS) and EEG
Brain Mapping techniques available from neuroscience re-
search to investigate how doctors manage clinical and
radiological data during veterinary diagnosis.
KBSs consist of rule-based reasoning, case-based rea-
soning and model-based reasoning, while ICSs include
genetic algorithms, artificial neural networks, fuzzy logic,
Bayesian networks, among other components. Different
combinations of the above methods have been used by
previous studies to model and explain medical reasoning
[1-4].
A study of diagnostic processing must allow free
time for physicians to process the data at each stage
of the diagnostic decision-making. In addition,
allowing for hypothesis re-evaluation precludes the
need for a rigid sequential protocol. These require-
ments make EEG a preferable tool for the recording
and analysis of brain activity compared to fMRI in-
vestigation [5].
Formalizing medical reasoning
Studies on medical diagnosis, independent of the
chosen modeling structure, have shown that physi-
cians usually obtain some key information (referred
here as ‘triggers’) from the history of the patient’s
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illness and physical examination, which leads to some
hypotheses that can guide the search for additional
data through laboratory tests, X-ray examinations,
computerized tomography, etc [4,6-9]. Doctors gain
valuable information from these auxiliary tests and
compare this information with their initial hypotheses.
Depending on the test results, the hypotheses are
confirmed, discarded or re-evaluated [4,10]. In this
approach, medical diagnosis is a characterization task
that depends on the ability to identify the critical fea-
tures (signs and symptoms) of a given case and the
ability to appropriately weigh and combine these fea-
tures to arrive at the correct diagnosis [4,6,8,9,11].
For example, in Figure 1, previous data including
the claudicating of the hind limbs as well as a ab-
sence of defecation and absence of urination is
thought to trigger a diagnosis of hip trauma with
urinary tract lesion. The elucidation of these inter-
mediate hypotheses requires an abdominal X-ray.
When requesting the X-ray, the physician is aiming
to detect potential bone fractures or splinters to con-
firm the hip trauma and the contrast fluid overflow in
the abdominal cavity that indicates a urinary tract
lesion.
According to Leão and Rocha [7] and Rocha [4],
diagnostic reasoning involves a set of structured rules
that involves networks of concepts and relationships
that may be formalized by the reasoning graph (RG)
shown in Figure 2. The trigger claudicating of the
hind limbs prompts the doctor to explore the hypoth-
esis of hip trauma, which is associated with positive
information about lack of defecation and/or lack of
urination, and raises the supposition about the occur-
rence of the urinary tract lesion. The identification of
bone fractures or splinters in the X-Ray confirms the
hip trauma and the identification of contrast fluid
overflow adds urinary tract lesion to the final
diagnostic.
Reasoning of a clinical case is to navigate the RG and
take into consideration at least two types of uncertainty:
a) uncertainty in the identification of the positive
symptoms, clinical signs and auxiliary tests results;
and
b) uncertainty in the prevalence of the positive
symptoms, clinical signs and auxiliary tests results.
The lower the uncertainties in the identification and
prevalence, the higher the certainty in the medical
decision-making. For example, the lower the uncertainties
in the identification and prevalence of claudicating of the
hind limbs, absence of defecation and/or absence of urin-
ation, the higher the certainty of asking for an X-ray exam.
In a similar manner, the lower the uncertainties in the
identification and prevalence of the X-ray indication of
bone fractures or splinters, the higher the certainty in hip
trauma and/or urinary tract lesion.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, the clinical
knowledge encoded by RG reads as a set of rules of
the type:
If (uncertainties in the identification and prevalence of
claudicating of the hind limbs, absence of defecation
and/or of urination) smaller than a}, then ask XR
otherwise consider other diagnostic hypothesis
If { uncertainties in the identification and
prevalence of claudicating of the hind limbs, lack of
defecation and/or lack of urination bone fractures
or splinters greater than a}, then revise diagnostic
hypothesis otherwise consider hip trauma hypothesis
and verify contrast fluid overflow
u HTð Þ ¼ p XRð Þ max u bsð Þ  p bsð Þ or u bfð Þ  p bfð Þ½ f g;
where u(HT), u(bs), u(bf ) represent the uncertainties of
hip trauma, bone splinters and bone fractures,
respectively and p(HT), p(bs), p(bf ) represent the
probabilities of hip trauma, bone splinters and bone
fractures, respectively,
otherwise
If { uncertainties in the identification and
prevalence of contrast fluid overflow is smaller
thana}, then consider urinary tract lesion too
otherwise disregard UTL
At each reasoning step, the RG navigation proceeds if
the calculated total uncertainty is smaller than a given
threshold a, otherwise the actual diagnostic hypothesis
has to be revised [4]. Therefore, navigation to the next
node is allowed if the identification uncertainty is low
and the prevalence is high.
The complexity of the reasoning graph is directly
linked to the number of nodes and edges between them
[4,7] and it inversely correlates with medical expertise,
being greater in the case of novices than in the case of
senior clinicians. In other words, experts, compared to
novices, use less clinical information nodes (to build
simple rules to support their decision-making). Expertise
in clinical decision-making is, therefore, the ability to
correctly identify the critical feature of a given case and
the ability to correctly weigh and combine these features
to support the decision-making [8]. This is consistent
with Mandin et al. [9] who proposed that ‘resolution of
clinical cases is markedly enhanced when medical know-
ledge becomes “elaborated,” or linked into networks of
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concepts and relationships … and then “compiled” into a
high order knowledge structure that links abridged intri-
cate networks into a scheme of relationships and diagno-
ses’. They also considered that ‘experts generally work
forward utilizing schemes specific to problems within
their domains of expertise and seldom rely on general
search strategies’.
Although there may be other strategies for medical
decision-making, we used the above sequential reasoning
strategy to guide the investigation protocol for this study.
Medical reasoning brain mapping
Despite the fact that new brain imaging techniques have
improved our ability to study of the processes of human
Figure 1 A three-step experimental protocol for examining diagnostic decision-making. The protocol includes reading a clinical history,
analyzing an X-ray and determining a final diagnosis (see the main text for further explanation).
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decision-making, there have been a lack of studies that
have investigated brain activity during diagnostic pro-
cessing, with the recent exception of the work by Melo
et al [12]. In the present study of diagnostic processing,
the EEG activity was recorded as physicians were pro-
vided with:
1) clinical history information (CH) to trigger
hypotheses that requires
2) X-ray data (XR) analysis to support
3) diagnostic decision-making (DG).
The study of diagnostic decision-making requires the
analysis of brain activity prior to the decision-making to
understand the cognitive processes associated with med-
ical reasoning. In contrast, most if not all of the experi-
ments involving EEG and decision-making described in
the literature, have focused on the analysis of brain ac-
tivity following decision-making or stimulus presentation
[13-26]. Physicians should be allowed free time for
process data and making decisions about diagnostic hy-
potheses, therefore, it is preferable to look the EEG
backwardly from the moment the decision was com-
pleted to have a better understanding of the process.
This was what Rocha et al. [5] proposed when they stud-
ied vote decision-making using EEG brain mapping
techniques [27-30]. With this approach, they were able
to disclose different patterns of brain activity associated
with different voting decisions. These results motivated
us to use the same EEG mapping technique to investi-
gate diagnostic decision-making.
Rocha et al. [5] used a new EEG brain mapping tech-
nique to study the voting intention declared by a sam-
ple of Brazilian electors one week before the
referendum day. Their results showed that the vote
decision-making engaged networks responsible for cal-
culating the uncertainty of identifying benefits and
identifying risk prevalence of the decision of
prohibiting or allowing firearm commerce and that the
topology of such networks was vote-sensitive (i.e.,
YES/NO). According to Rocha et al. [5], the adequacy
of decision-making depends on the evaluation of the
risks and benefits. Principal component analysis (PCA)
of the EEG activity revealed the existence of three dif-
ferent patterns (Pi) of brain activity, which explained
80% of the data covariance associated with the voting
decision. Rocha et al. [5] proposed that the networks
disclosed by the P1 and P2 patterns, which were similar
for both types of voters, are those in charge of calculat-
ing the adequacy or intention of each voting decision.
Specifically, Rocha et al. [5] proposed that the P2
pattern was associated with the executive network
in charge of controlling vote intention calculation,
whereas the P1 pattern was associated with the calcula-
tion itself. In contrast, the P3 pattern differed for YES
and NO voters, and the authors proposed that the net-
works disclosed by the P3 pattern were responsible for
the risk and benefit evaluations.
In this study, we recorded the EEG activities of veter-
inary radiologists making decisions about diagnostic
hypotheses from real clinical cases that required comple-
mentary X-ray information. We hypothesize that:
1. The brain activity recorded during the phases CH,
XR and DG should not be significantly different
because the reasoning process during these phases
involve both the identification and prevalence
uncertainty assessment and the combination of the
two, to support decision-making;
2. PCA should reveal distinct brain activity patterns
associated with the uncertainty assessment and
handling;
3. Regression analysis should complement the above
hypotheses by disclosing a correlation between the
result (right or wrong) of the diagnostic decision-
making and the EEG activity recorded by each
electrode during the CH, XR and DG.
4. This regression analysis should be sensitive to the
clinical experience of the volunteers, as measured by
the number of years of practice.
After this introduction, we will describe the methods
we employed, followed by the results of our study as well
as a discussion of our findings and their implications for
diagnostic decision-making processes.
Figure 2 An example of a reasoning graph RG. Clinical data are
combined to support the decision to ask for an X-Ray exam to
obtain additional information to reach a final diagnostic) (see the
main text for further explanation). CH means reading a clinical
history, XR analyzing an X-ray and DG determining a final diagnosis.
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Methods
Twenty-nine veterinary radiologists of both sexes (16 fe-
males and 13 males), with clinical practice (expertise)
varying from 0.5 to 15 years, were invited to read four-
teen clinical histories that required X-ray information to
determine a diagnosis (Figure 1). The cases were se-
lected by a senior radiologist and were submitted to a
several other radiologists who determined that these
cases were of adequate difficulty for the purposes of this
study.
After reading each clinical history, the volunteers exam-
ined a radiographic image that had one or more radio-
graphic features that were relevant for the diagnostic
decision-making. The volunteers had to select a number
that was associated with the feature they considered rele-
vant and to drag it to a corresponding image in the X-ray.
In the sequence, they were presented with four possible
diagnostic hypotheses. Their options were to select one of
the hypotheses as the correct diagnosis or to completely or
partially review the case. Their EEGs (20 electrodes placed
according to the 10/20 system; ear lobe reference; imped-
ance smaller than 10 kOhm; low bandpass filter: 50 Hz;
sampling rate of 256 Hz and 10 bits resolution) were
recorded during the entire task and at the ending moments
(that is, the moment of time participants move from one
phase to the next) of the clinical history reading phase,TCH,
the X-Ray inspection phase, TXR, and the decision phase,
TDG, and at the selected diagnosis were also annotated.
EEG was visually inspected and bad recorded epochs were
discarded on an single basis. The selected diagnosis (d) was
compared to the corrected diagnosis for each case and re-
coded as d = 1, if the selection was correct or d = 0, if
otherwise.
Signals from a multi-channel EEG are unavoidably
correlated due to the fact that the recordings from each
electrode are generated by local field potentials or source
signals (si) from several distinct cortical areas. The
source signals si can be summed up and projected to the
electrodes. This is due to the radial orientation of pyr-
amidal cells relative to the cortical surface. Were not for
this possibility, the local fields would partially or com-
pletely cancel each other out. In this context, EEG data
di(t) recorded at a single electrode ei are a simple
weighted sum of underlying (k) cortical source signals si
that are active at time t, that is:
di tð Þ ¼
Xk
i¼1
wisi tð Þ ð1Þ
where wi stands for the weight assigned to source si. The
number kof active sources are determined by the task
being currently processed by the brain.
A major question in EEG analysis is to locate EEG signal
sources si. In an attempt to answer this question, different
techniques have being used to correlate these to specific
electrical sources locations. Recent studies have shown that
source si varies for each EEG components [31-35] and
some of these studies have shown that different sources
may be linked to the same component. Therefore, each
electrode may record signals from sources that have differ-
ent spatial and temporal distributions, and different elec-
trodes may record signals from the same source. In this
way EEG data di(t) recorded by each single electrode ei may
provide different or redundant information about the
sources activated by the task being currently processed. In
this context, a key datum that may be obtained from the
EEG about how the task is being processed is the amount
of information H(ei) each electrode may provide about the
sources si [5,30].
To study the EEG correlates of cognition one has
to investigate the relations between k EEG source
components si supposed to be involved in the cogni-
tive task solving and behavioral variables that provide
information about how the cognitive task was solved.
To be sure that all k activated si are indentified re-
quires the use of all available EEG analytical tools to
provide information about distinct sources si. In
addition, the statistical complexity of the investigation
increases as the number of EEG and behavioral vari-
ables increases. Therefore, at least as an initial ap-
proach, it is interesting to avoid the identification
problem and to reduce the number of studied EEG
variables.
Because EEG data are assumed to be a weighted sum
of the electrical activity of different sources, correlation
analysis of the EEG activity di(t) recorded by the differ-
ent electrodes ei may be used to calculate H(ei) in order
to summarize information provided by each electrode ei
about all involved sources si into a single variable as pro-
posed by Rocha et al [5]. The rationality is the following.
The Pearson correlation R is +1 in the case of a
perfect positive (increasing) linear relationship (correl-
ation), −1 in the case of a perfect decreasing (nega-
tive) linear relationship (anticorrelation),and some
value between −1 and +1 in all other cases, indicating
the degree of linear dependence between the vari-
ables. As it approaches zero there is less of a rela-
tionship (closer to uncorrelated). The closer the
coefficient is to either −1 or +1, the stronger the cor-
relation between the variables. In this context, the
correlation strength r is equal to |R|. If data di(t),dj(t)
furnished by two electrodes ei, ej provide equivalent
information about sources si then Pearson correlation
coefficient Ri,j calculated for di(t),dj(t) will approach
±1, otherwise it will approach 0. The highest uncer-
tainty about the information equivalence provided by
ei, ej occurs when the correlation strength ri,j ap-
proaches 0.5. Therefore, in the same line of reasoning
Ribas et al. BMC Neuroscience 2013, 14:109 Page 5 of 15
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/14/109
used by Shannon to define the amount of information
provided by a random variable, it is proposed that
the informational equivalence, H(ri,j) of di(t),dj(t) fur-
nished by ei, ej is the expected value E(I(ri,j)) of the
information I(ri,j) provided by ri,j. Therefore:
H ri;j
  ¼ E I ri;j
  
¼ − ri;j log2 ri;j
 þ 1−ri;j
 
log2 1−ri;j
   ð2Þ
such that if ri,j = 0.5 then H(ri,j) = 1 and if ri,j = 1or ri,j
= 0 then H(ri,j) = 0.
Now, given
r i ¼
X19
j¼1
ri;j
19
ð3Þ
the entropy of r i is
H rið Þ ¼ −K r i log2r i þ 1−r ið Þ log2 1−r ið Þ½  ð4Þ
where K is a constant. The entropy quantifies the mean
informational equivalence from di(t) concerning that
provided by all other dj(t), because the different elec-
trodes (information channels) provide different, but cor-
related, information about si.
In this context, we propose that
H eið Þ ¼
X19
j¼1
½H r ið Þ−H ri;jÞ
 
19
ð5Þ
quantifies the information provided by di(t) about the
sources si involved in a cognitive task solving, because
a) if ri,j = k for all all ej then r i ¼ k, H ri;j
  ¼ H rið Þ for
all ej, and consequently H(ei) = 0. This indicates that
di(t) ei does not provide any additional information
about the sources si;
b) for all other conditions0 <H(ei) <1and quantifies the
information provided by di(t) about the sources si.
While Event Related Activity and Spectral Band Ana-
lysis may provide information about specific and local-
ized sources involved in a task solving, H(ei) provides
information about the spatial and temporal distribution
of these sources, therefore, provides information about
how different sets of neuron enroll themselves in a
widely distributed network to solve a task [30]. Another
interesting H(ei) property is that it summarizes informa-
tion about all sources into a single variable, simplifying
many analysis (e.g., regression analysis, principal compo-
nent analysis, etc.) involving behavioral and neural vari-
ables [5,30].
An EEG time epoch of two seconds before the marks
TCH,TXR and TDG was selected for analysis. The normal-
ized values of H(ei) were used to construct brain maps
according to the procedures described by previous stud-
ies [5,27-30].
The mean entropy H0(ei) was computed from a hypo-
thetical brain artificially constructed by randomly shuf-
fling the EEG recorded activity across the participants.
Next, the Z-scores between the observed mean entropy
H(ei) were computed for each of the EEG epochs (CH,
XR and DG) and H0(ei). This was done to estimate the
role of chance in determining the values of the observed
H(ei). The minimum Z-score for all of these calculations
was 1.85 (p = 0.0322, one-tailed test). Therefore, it was
concluded that H0(ei) differed significantly from H(ei) for
all EEG epochs, rejecting the role of chance in determin-
ing the observed results.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical
tool to investigate patterns of covariation in a large
number of variables and to determine if information
may be condensed into small sets of these variables
called principal components. This transformation is de-
fined in such a way that the first principal component is
the one that accounts for as much of the variability in
the data as possible), and each succeeding component
in turn explain the subsequent amount of variance pos-
sible under the constraint that it be orthogonal to (i.e.,
uncorrelated with) the preceding components. Factorial
mappings are proposed to represent the activity of the
neural circuits enrolled in a cognitive task because they
condensed the information provided by the electrodes
sampling this neural activity. In this ways, factorial ana-
lysis does not map brain areas activated by a cognitive
task, but provides information to disclose the activity of
circuits composed by neurons distributed on different
areas of the brain recruited by the cognitive task, be-
cause H(ei) measures the amount of information pro-
vided by ei about spatial and temporal distribution of si.
PCA was applied here to study the co variation of H(ei)
calculated for each of the 406 decision (29 subjects
times 14 clinical cases) during each of the selected
epochs CH, XR and DG. The factorial brain maps were
constructed to describe the results of the PCA using the
procedures employed by Rocha et al. [5,27-30], taking
the loading values (the correlation coefficients between
the electrodes (rows) and factors (columns)) fi(ei) of H
(ei) for each of the factors Fj(j = 1,2,3) into account. To
estimate the potential similarities between each factorial
brain mapping that was associated to each Fj(j = 1,2,3,4)
for each EEG time epoch, we used Pearson correlation
coefficients, which were calculated for their respective
loading values fi(ei). In addition to the loadings to
summarize our variables (the electrode entropies H(ei))
we calculated the individual scores to summarize
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relationships among the 406 observations (different
clinical decisions times individuals). The loading and
score plotting were used to check the existence of dif-
ferences between the three phases.
A logistic regression analysis was used to study the as-
sociation between the diagnostic decision d (dependent
variable; wrong = 0, right = 1) and H(ei), which was cal-
culated for each of the electrodes (independent vari-
ables) and adjusted for the variable expertise (potential
confounder). Logistic regression analysis, therefore, may
disclose the electrodes that provide information that is
important in decision-making. The normalized values of
the regression coefficients βi multiplied by the entropy,
βiH(ei) were used to generate the color-coded brain
mapping images to display the results of this regression
analysis. Those that were statistically positive βiH(ei)
were color coded from green (normalized βiH(ei) tending
to 0) to dark blue (normalized βiH(ei) tending to +1).
Those that were statistically negative βiH(ei) ranged from
pink (normalized βiH(ei) tending to 0) to dark red (nor-
malized βiH(ei) tending to -1), and those that were statis-
tically non-significant βiH(ei) are shown in orange. The
Holm-Bonferroni method and the calculation of the
relative risks (expβiH(ei))) with their respective confi-
dence intervals were used to calculate the significance of
these statistical inferences.
This work was reviewed and approved by the Institu-
tional Ethical Review Board. All of the volunteers signed
a written informed consent.
Results
The median reading time of the clinical history was 11
seconds and the median time spent on the X-ray ana-
lysis was 24 seconds. The mean time for choosing the
correct diagnostic hypothesis was 8 seconds and the
average performance for correctly diagnosing the cases
used in this study was 71.5%. These short time periods
in each phase corroborate the hypothesis that cases
were of adequate difficulty for the purposes of this
study because difficult tasks are usually time consum-
ing. In addition, only 31% of the doctors had reviewed
a clinical history and/or X-ray date once, which dem-
onstrates that the decision-making required some cog-
nitive effort. The need to review the cases also varied
according to the number of years the doctors had been
practicing.
Table 1 shows the entropy values H(ei) calculated for
each electrode ei and each stage of the diagnostic
decision-making process. The normalized H eið Þ values
were obtained for each electrode and for each stage
(CH, XR or DG) and were used to generate the entropy
brain maps shown in Figure 3. The Pearson correlation
coefficients calculated for the entropy values and the dif-
ferent stages (CH, XR and DG) are shown in Table 1.
The Pearson correlation coefficients were very high for
all of the combinations, which allowed us to conclude
that H(ei) did not substantially change during the differ-
ent diagnostic decision stages. This trend implied that
the associated EEG brain maps, shown in Figure 3, were
similar to each other.
The brain maps in Figure 3 show that the H(ei)
attained its highest values for two groups of electrodes:
the frontal bilateral electrodes and right parietal-
occipital electrodes. In the case of frontal bilateral elec-
trodes, the highest H(ei) values were obtained for FP1
and FP2. In the case of the right temporal-parietal-oc-
cipital electrodes, the highest H(ei) value was obtained
for O2. A third group of electrodes was identified when
the lowest H(ei) values were considered. This group in-
cluded the CZ, C3 and P3.
Table 1 Entropy H(ei) (and normalized entropy H eið Þ)
results from the EEG activity associated with the clinical
history reading (CH), X-ray analysis (XR) and diagnostic
decision-making (DG) as well as the Pearson correlation
coefficient (R) values between the different stages of the
diagnostic decision-making process
H(ei) H eið Þ
CH XR DG CH XR DG
C3 1.56 1.62 1.6 0.13 0.09 0.10
C4 1.63 1.75 1.65 0.26 0.31 0.20
CZ 1.49 1.57 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
F3 1.83 1.85 1.81 0.63 0.48 0.51
F4 1.8 1.85 1.82 0.57 0.48 0.53
F7 1.86 1.94 1.92 0.69 0.64 0.73
F8 1.73 1.83 1.75 0.44 0.45 0.39
FP1 1.95 1.99 1.99 0.85 0.72 0.86
FP2 1.96 2.03 2.01 0.87 0.79 0.90
FZ 1.91 1.96 1.94 0.78 0.67 0.76
O1 1.75 1.83 1.8 0.48 0.45 0.49
O2 2.03 2.15 2.06 1.00 1.00 1.00
OZ 1.78 1.88 1.82 0.54 0.53 0.53
P3 1.57 1.69 1.59 0.15 0.21 0.08
P4 1.87 2.00 1.9 0.70 0.74 0.69
PZ 1.89 2.02 1.91 0.74 0.78 0.71
T3 1.66 1.78 1.69 0.31 0.36 0.27
T4 1.70 1.82 1.71 0.39 0.43 0.31
T5 1.73 1.82 1.72 0.44 0.43 0.33
T6 1.92 2.06 1.95 0.80 0.84 0.78
R
CH XR DG
CH 1.00 0.97 0.99
XR 0.97 1.00 0.96
DG 0.99 0.97 1.00
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The PCA results of the EEG activity associated with
the clinical history reading (CH), X-ray analysis (XR)
and diagnostic decision-making (DG) are shown in
Table 2. Table 2 also shows the Pearson correlation
correlation coefficients between the PCA factors for
CH-XR, CH-DG and XR-DG.
Three factors accounted for more than 85% of the total
variance in the CH, XR and DG EEG entropy data. The ei-
genvalues varied from 14.77 for XR-P1 to 1.03 for XR-P3.
Each of these factors characterized a distinct pattern of
brain activity co variation and was used to generate the
brain mappings (P1, P2, P3), as shown in Figure 4. The Pear-
son correlation coefficients in Table 2 clearly show that the
PCA brain mappings were very similar when the CH, XR
and DG were compared.
The P1 brain mappings show that H(ei) calculated for the
frontal electrodes FP1, FP2, F3, F7, FZ, F4 and F8 covaried
together; the P2 brain mappings showed a high H(ei) co
variation for the electrodes T3, T4, T5, C3, C4 and CZ; and
the P3 brain mappings showed a high H(ei) co variation for
the electrodes O1, O2, OZ, P3, P4, and PZ.
Figure 5 show the 3-D plots for loadings and scores,
calculated for the 3 patterns Pi shown in Figure 4.
As can be seen in Figure 5, both the loading and score
3-D plots show cluster of variables and individuals from
the 3 diagnostic decision phases that are overlapped. No
difference between the 3 phases is remarkable with this
technique.
Table 3 showed the results of the logistic regression
analysis between the diagnostic decision, d (dependent
variable; wrong = 0, right = 1), and H(ei) calculated for
each of the electrodes (independent variables). The
results of the logistic regression analysis between d
and H(ei) was calculated for each of the electrodes
and controlled for the variable expertise (potential
confounder), as shown in Table 4. The expertise con-
tributed to an increase R2 and to an increase of the
value of d.
The logistic brain mapping calculated from the nor-
malized values βiH eið Þ in Table 3 is shown in Figure 6A
and the mapping calculated from Table 4 is shown in
Figure 6B.
In the case of Table 3 and Figure 6A, the high values
of H(ei) calculated for C4, F3, O1, OZ and P3 were as-
sociated with correct diagnosing because the values of
βi obtained for these electrodes were positive. In con-
trast, the high values of H(ei) calculated for C3, O2,
PZ, T4 and T5 were associated with incorrect diagnos-
ing because the values of βi obtained for these elec-
trodes were negative. The use of expertise as a control
variable (Table 4 and Figure 6b) had changed these
correlations such that the high values of H(ei) calcu-
lated for C4, F3, F8, OZ and T6 were associated with
correct diagnosing and the high values of H(ei) calcu-
lated for CZ and T4 were associated with incorrect
diagnosing. These two brain mappings were correlated
at the level of 0.59 as evaluated by Pearson correlation
coefficient and the main differences between the two
were observed for the electrodes with negative βi’s. In
other words, the main differences involved the
Figure 3 The entropy brain maps associated with the clinical history reading (CH), X-ray analysis (XR) and diagnosis decision-making
(DG). The normalized entropy values obtained for each electrode were color coded such that the dark-blue areas were associated with the
highest entropy values and the dark-red areas were associated with the lowest entropy values.
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electrodes for C3, PZ and T5, that exhibited high en-
tropy values H(ei) and were associated with incorrect
diagnostics, and P3 and O1, which displayed high entropy
values H(ei) are associated with correct diagnostics.
Table 5 shows the results of the logistic regression
analysis between the expertise (as measured by the
years of practice) and the H(ei) calculated for each of
the electrodes. This regression explains approximately
34% of the observed data. The regression brain map-
ping calculated from the normalized values βiH eið Þ in
Table 5 is shown in Figure 7.
The high values of H(ei) calculated for CZ, F4, FP1,
FP2, O1, OZ and T4 were positively associated with ex-
pertise because the values of βi obtained for these elec-
trodes were positive. In contrast, the high values of H(ei)
calculated for C4, F7, O2, PZ, T3 and T5 were negatively
associated with expertise because the values of βi
obtained for these electrodes were negative.
Discussion
The difficulty of diagnostic decision-making for the present
set of clinical cases was considered to be appropriate for
the expertise of the studied veterinary radiologists because
they correctly diagnosed 71% of the cases and the total pro-
cessing time for each case was approximately one minute.
In addition, solving the cases involved an acceptable level
of cognitive effort because only 31% of the radiologists
needed to review the data to reach a final solution.
The Z-score analysis clearly demonstrated that entropy H
(ei) calculated for all the 20 electrodes was statistically sig-
nificant because the null-hypothesis was rejected. The H(ei)
brain maps in Figure 3 showed no differences between the
Table 2 PCA results of the EEG activity associated with clinical history reading (CH), X-ray analysis (XR) and diagnostic
decision-making (DG)
CH XR DG
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
C3 0.31 0.68 0.02 C3 0.23 0.80 0.05 C3 0.20 0.78 0.16
C4 0.06 0.71 0.30 C4 0.11 0.89 0.24 C4 0.08 0.84 0.28
CZ 0.13 0.75 0.33 CZ 0.14 0.85 0.27 CZ 0.10 0.83 0.31
F3 0.88 0.13 0.28 F3 0.84 0.27 0.29 F3 0.86 0.14 0.31
F4 0.89 0.18 0.18 F4 0.86 0.28 0.21 F4 0.87 0.22 0.22
F7 0.85 0.29 0.23 F7 0.87 0.28 0.18 F7 0.87 0.24 0.20
F8 0.73 0.37 0.17 F8 0.72 0.38 0.28 F8 0.77 0.35 0.13
FP1 0.82 0.05 0.48 FP1 0.85 0.05 0.46 FP1 0.80 0.05 0.52
FP2 0.81 0.09 0.48 FP2 0.85 −0.12 0.42 FP2 0.80 0.02 0.50
FZ 0.91 0.12 0.24 FZ 0.89 0.24 0.24 FZ 0.88 0.12 0.27
O1 0.51 0.25 0.78 O1 0.56 0.23 0.76 O1 0.49 0.25 0.80
O2 0.34 0.12 0.89 O2 0.38 0.25 0.85 O2 0.33 0.22 0.88
OZ 0.27 0.09 0.80 OZ 0.28 0.31 0.76 OZ 0.24 0.23 0.82
P3 0.24 0.67 0.59 P3 0.27 0.69 0.56 P3 0.25 0.66 0.61
P4 0.29 0.41 0.78 P4 0.30 0.49 0.75 P4 0.26 0.45 0.80
PZ 0.29 0.37 0.79 PZ 0.35 0.44 0.74 PZ 0.30 0.40 0.80
T3 0.20 0.83 0.18 T3 0.23 0.81 0.27 T3 0.23 0.85 0.20
T4 0.06 0.59 0.63 T4 0.13 0.79 0.44 T4 0.10 0.74 0.51
T5 0.34 0.72 0.43 T5 0.40 0.68 0.40 T5 0.38 0.64 0.51
T6 0.38 0.32 0.81 T6 0.48 0.36 0.73 T6 0.39 0.37 0.79
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
% total Cumul. % total Cumul. % total Cumul.
Eigen Varia % Eigen Varia % Eigen Varia %
1 14.15 70.75 70.75 1 14.77 73.85 73.85 1 13.92 69.62 69.62
2 1.65 8.27 79.02 2 1.58 7.92 81.77 2 1.84 9.20 78.82
3 1.30 6.48 85.50 3 1.03 5.15 86.92 3 1.35 6.74 85.56
CH-XR CH-DG XR-DG
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0.99 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98
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distinct stages (CH, XR and DG) of the clinical reasoning
process as demonstrated by the high Pearson correlation
coefficient values (see Table 1). Interestingly, the highest
values of H(ei) were obtained for the frontal electrodes F3,
F4, F7, F8, FP1, FP2 and FZ, as well as for the right
occipital-parietal electrodes. The lowest values of H(ei) were
computed for the electrodes C3, C4, CZ and P3 that were
the main components of the principal components analysis
(PCA) pattern P2.
The PCA brain mappings in Figure 4 revealed the ex-
istence of 3 patterns of brain activity (P1, P2 and P3) that
are very similar for the 3 stages (CH, XR, DG) of the
clinical reasoning process, as demonstrated by the high
values of their Pearson correlation coefficients (Table 2).
Pattern P1 consists of all the frontal electrodes; pattern
P2 is bilateral and consists of the temporal-central elec-
trodes, although T5 is missing in the DG phase. Finally,
pattern P3 predominantly consists of the occipital-
parietal electrodes, although it also includes T6.
Intriguingly, the patterns P1 and P3 overlap with the elec-
trodes that exhibit the highest mean entropy (Figure 2),
whereas pattern P2 includes most of the electrodes that
exhibits the lowest values of the mean entropy. A possible
explanation for these findings is to assume that diagnostic
reasoning is supported by neural networks of small-world
type [36] in which some areas play the role of hub nodes
that are well connected to all the other complementary
nodes (areas) recruited in the same processing. These hub
nodes are supposed, therefore, to have high values of H(ei)
in comparison to the complementary nodes.
These results appear to confirm our assumption that
brain activity patterns during the CH, XR and DG stages
did not differ because it was associated with the assess-
ment and processing of the symptom or sign iden-
tification uncertainty, prevalence (or premises), and
hypothesis (consequence) plausibility. The Pearson cor-
relation coefficients were very high for all pattern com-
parisons, which mean that the PCA patterns are similar
Figure 4 PCA brain mappings (P1, P2, P3) associated with
clinical history reading (CH), X-ray analysis (XR) and diagnostic
decision-making (DG). The normalized loadings for each PCA
factor greater than 0.5 in Table 2 were color-coded from yellow to
dark-blue to generate the brain maps. The dark-blue areas depicted
the electrodes where entropy H(ei) was heavily loaded in the
corresponding factor.
Figure 5 Loading and Score 3-D plots for the 3 patterns resulting from PCA brain mappings (P1, P2, P3) associated with clinical history
reading (CH) in blue, X-ray analysis (XR) in yellow and diagnostic (DG) in red.
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for all phases of clinical diagnosis. In addition, the load-
ing and score 3-D plotting in Figure 5 did not disclose
any remarkable difference between the 3 diagnostic
stages, although pattern visual inspection of Figure 4
may provide support to some P3 differences between DG
stage and CH or XR stages. Therefore, we hypothesize
that the three different patterns of brain activity revealed
by PCA are to be associated with different tasks that are
required by clinical reasoning.
Rocha [4] and Leão and Rocha [7] proposed elsewhere
that the clinical decision-making is an analytical process
that uses a structured set of rules (e.g., Figure 2) to
correctly:
a) weigh the uncertainty of the identification of the
sign and symptoms that characterizes a particular
disease [4,7];
b) weigh the uncertainty of the prevalence of the above
features [4,7]; and
c) combine these features to arrive at the correct
diagnosis [4,7].
A word of caution concerning the above hypotheses,
however, is necessary because H(ei) is a variable that
summarizes information about sets of neurons that are
activated in the attempt of solving a given task. There-
fore, it is quite possible that PCA mappings have
disclosed the overall structure of clinical reasoning, as
proposed in a to c above without detecting fine-grained
details characteristic of each diagnostic phase.
Here, we propose that a key information from the
clinical history (e.g., claudicating of the hind limbs in
Figures 1 and 2) triggers [4] a set of structured rules
(RG) to be further investigated [6,7,9,11]. Clinical rea-
soning is the navigation of this RG, taking into consider-
ation the uncertainty of the identification of symptoms
and signs and their prevalence. Taking into consider-
ation the literature regarding working memory and ex-
ecutive functions [37-40], we propose that pattern P1
(Figure 4) discloses the brain activity that is associated
with the recognition of triggers in CH; rehearsal of the
Table 3 Logistic regression analysis between the
diagnostic decision and H(ei)
Dependent variable: d
Final loss: 645.85 R = 0.37 R2 = 0.138
H-B
βi Std.Err. p-level βiHðeiÞ
Intercept 1.39 0.09 0.234
C3 −1.97 0.39 0.000* 0.01
C4 2.41 0.29 0.000* 1.00
CZ −0.65 0.32 0.040 0.50
F3 1.11 0.32 0.000* 0.71
F4 0.36 0.35 0.301 0.50
F7 0.15 0.25 0.535 0.50
F8 −0.17 0.25 0.497 0.50
FP1 −0.20 0.22 0.375 0.50
FP2 0.18 0.27 0.505 0.50
FZ −0.71 0.29 0.016 0.50
O1 1.06 0.30 0.001* 0.69
O2 −2.02 0.29 0.000* 0.00
OZ 2.15 0.33 0.000* 0.94
P3 1.23 0.42 0.004* 0.73
P4 0.64 0.29 0.028 0.50
PZ −1.76 0.38 0.000* 0.06
T3 0.36 0.28 0.190 0.50
T4 −0.91 0.32 0.004* 0.25
T5 −0.71 0.25 0.004* 0.30
T6 0.45 0.27 0.094 0.50
The values βiH eið Þ are the normalized values of the product βiH(ei). The
statistically significant inferences according to the Holm-Bonferroni (H-B)
method are marked with asterisks.
Table 4 The logistic regression analysis between the
diagnostic decision and H(ei) controlled for expertise
Dependent variable: d
Final loss: 595.43 R = 0.45 R2 = 0.205
H-B
βi Std.Err. p-level βiHðeiÞ
Intercept 0.05 0.13 0.677
Expertise 0.24 0.02 0.000
C3 −0.21 0.34 0.531 0.50
C4 1.43 0.22 0.000* 1.00
CZ −0.88 0.29 0.003* 0.11
F3 0.75 0.30 0.008* 0.74
F4 0.07 0.29 0.815 0.50
F7 0.08 0.21 0.687 0.50
F8 0.34 0.19 0.009* 0.58
FP1 0.12 0.24 0.613 0.50
FP2 −0.07 0.26 0.801 0.50
FZ −0.86 0.30 0.005 0.50
O1 0.33 0.27 0.231 0.50
O2 −0.65 0.26 0.013 0.50
OZ 1.11 0.30 0.000* 0.88
P3 −0.19 0.43 0.653 0.50
P4 0.06 0.29 0.825 0.50
PZ −0.59 0.31 0.063 0.50
T3 0.06 0.25 0.823 0.50
T4 −1.17 0.33 0.000* 0.00
T5 −0.43 0.25 0.078 0.50
T6 1.27 0.32 0.000* 0.94
The values βiH eið Þ are the normalized values of the product βiH(ei), which
were estimated for those inferences according to the Holm-Bonferroni (H-B)
method. The statistically significant inferences are marked with asterisks.
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corresponding RGs for analysis and the navigation of
these reasoning networks according to the uncertainty
of the other pieces of information in CH and XR, as well
as finally selecting the most plausible diagnosis in DG.
Because P1 did not differ between the three experimental
epochs (CH, XR and DG), this may be interpreted that
the same RG was considered during the entire clinical
reasoning that was associated with each clinical case.
This may be true either if just one RG was triggered for
the analysis in the simple cases, or more than one RG
were being taken into consideration in the complex
cases.
Identification uncertainty assessment is a task associ-
ated with the semantic decoding of both verbal informa-
tion in CH and visual information in XR. In both cases,
this semantic decoding involves the recall of information
about the symptoms or signals from memory that were
learned from previous cases and/or specialized literature
[6,7,9,11]. Identification uncertainty is a direct function
of how variable a symptom or signal may be and of how
clearly it is observed in the case under consideration. In
this experiment, the identification uncertainty in CH is
mostly dependent on the former and in XR, it is mostly
dependent on the latter.
The assessment of the uncertainty of association be-
tween a signal or symptom and a given diagnosis, or
prevalence, is also a task associated with semantic de-
coding in CH and XR. It is also dependent on both the
information learned from previous experience and litera-
ture. In this study, the prevalence in CH and XR is
dependent on strength of the association between the
signal or symptom and the diagnosis as learned from the
literature and/or previous experience. Here, we propose
that pattern P3 discloses the brain activity associated
with the assessment of both uncertainty of identification
and prevalence because it involves electrodes that have
been reported to be involved with the semantic decoding
of both verbal and visual information [41-44]. Because
P3 does not vary during the experiment, we have to con-
clude that the same neural circuits are involved in this
uncertainty assessment despite its type and type of
symptom or signal.
RG navigation is dependent on using uncertainty of
identification and prevalence associated with its terminal
Figure 6 The brain mappings of the logistic regression
between the diagnostic decision, d (dependent variable;
wrong = 0, right = 1), and H(ei), which were calculated for each
of the electrodes (independent variables). The normalized βiH eið Þ
values obtained for each electrode were color-coded such that
yellow to dark-blue areas were associated with increasingly values of
positive βi and pink to dark-red areas were associated with
increasingly values of negative βi. The areas in white were not
statically significant and the difference between the mappings in A
(see Table 3) and B (see Table 4) is the use of expertise as a control
variable in B.
Table 5 The logistic regression analysis between expertise
and H(ei)
Dependent variable: expertise
Final loss: 234.44 R = 0.58 R2 = 0.34
H-B
βi Std.Err. p-level βiHðeiÞ
Intercept −0.02 0.09 0.00
C3 −0.06 0.09 0.508 0.50
C4 −0.23 0.09 0.010* 0.46
CZ 0.34 0.09 0.000* 0.86
F3 −0.18 0.08 0.019 0.50
F4 0.38 0.08 0.000* 0.89
F7 −0.41 0.06 0.000* 0.33
F8 −0.10 0.06 0.104 0.50
FP1 0.49 0.06 0.000* 0.97
FP2 0.25 0.06 0.000* 0.80
FZ −0.09 0.07 0.217 0.50
O1 0.23 0.08 0.006* 0.78
O2 −0.88 0.07 0.000* 0.00
OZ 0.54 0.06 0.000* 1.00
P3 0.09 0.08 0.275 0.50
P4 −0.07 0.08 0.384 0.50
PZ −0.61 0.08 0.000* 0.19
T3 −0.26 0.06 0.000* 0.44
T4 0.50 0.07 0.000* 0.98
T5 −0.28 0.07 0.000* 0.42
T6 −0.05 0.07 0.449 0.50
The values βiH eið Þ are the normalized values of the product βiH(ei), which
were estimated for those inferences according to the Holm-Bonferroni (H-B)
method. The statistically significant inferences are marked with asterisks.
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nodes (symptoms or signals) to calculate the plausibility
of the hypothesis encoded by intermediate or root nodes
(see Figure 2). In other words, the clinical reasoning or
RG navigation is dependent on using the uncertainty of
identification and prevalence about the antecedents of a
given rule to calculate the plausibility of the hypothesis
encoded by its consequence. Rocha [4] proposed that
logic operators of type and, or, most of all, at least one,
etc. are used to calculate the plausibility of each rule
consequent taking into account identification uncer-
tainty and prevalence of each rule antecedents. We
propose that pattern P2 discloses the brain activity of the
neural circuits involved with such logical calculations.
The results from neuroeconomic studies have involved
central-parietal areas with the calculation of the plausi-
bility of an outcome given the uncertainty about its
causes [45,46]. Because similar types of logical calcula-
tions were required in CH, XR and DG, the pattern P2
should be similar for these three experimental epochs as
observed in Figure 4.
The logistic regression analysis (Tables 3, 4 and
Figure 5) showed that the correlation between diagnos-
ing (d) and H(ei) is influenced by expertise, which in-
creased R2, reducing the number and changed some of
the electrodes that were significantly correlated with d.
This is consistent with the literature showing that ex-
perts use a smaller and more structured set of rules in
comparison to the novice [4,7,9]. The logistic regression
analysis controlled by expertise, showed that activity
recorded by the electrodes C4, F3, F8, OZ and T6 is
positively correlated with the success in making the cor-
rect diagnosis. In other words, the clinical reasoning
success increased as the amount of information of the
electrical activity recorded by these electrodes increased.
On the contrary, the increase in the correlation entropy
of the electrical activity recorded by the electrodes CZ
and T4 increase was associated with a high probability
of an unsuccessful clinical reasoning.
The positive correlation between the correct diagnosis
and the amount of information provided by C4, F3, F8,
OZ and T6 may be explained if we assume that the in-
crease of H(ei) at
a) T6 is associated with a correct assessment of total
uncertainty;
b) OZ and C4 is associated with a correct calculation
of the hypothesis plausibility and
c) F3 and F8 is associated with the selection of the
most plausible clinical and XR hypothesis.
The negative correlation between correct diagnosis
and the amount of information provided by CZ and T4
can be explained if we assume that the increase of H(ei)
calculated for these electrodes is related to the analysis
of the alternative wrong hypothesis that in some cases
were assumed to be the most plausible and induced the
volunteer to make a wrong decision.
A comparison of the mappings A and B, in Figure 5,
shows that the adjustment of the logistic model by
the variable ‘expertise’ mostly reduced the number of
electrodes that were correlated with wrong diagnos-
ing. More specifically, the activity recorded by the
electrodes C3, P3, PZ, T5 and O2 became less influ-
ential in the diagnostic decision-making as the expert-
ise progressed. Here, the inference assuming correct
diagnosis to be negatively correlated with the amount
of information provided by CZ did not reach the
Holm-Bonferroni significance criteria (p < 0.007), al-
though its calculated p-level resulted 0.039. In
addition, the regression analysis showed that expertise
correlates with H(ei) (Table 5 and Figure 6) such that
a high H(ei) at FP1, FP2, F4, CZ, T4, O1 and OZ is
associated with long clinical practice and the opposite
is true for the electrodes F7, PZ, T3, T5 and O2. In
Figure 7 The brain mappings of the regression between
expertise and H(ei) calculated for each of the electrodes
(independent variables). Color-coding is similar to that in Figure 6.
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other words, the neural circuits support clinical
reasoning to reorganize themselves as the number
of years for clinical practice increases. Such reor-
ganization increases the correlation entropy of FP1,
FP2, F4, CZ, T4, O1 and OZ and decreases that of
PZ, T3, T5 and O2. It may be assumed therefore, that
most of the electrodes recording the activity associ-
ated with patterns P1 and P3 increase H(ri) with clin-
ical practice whereas the opposite is true for the
majority of the electrodes that compose the pattern
P2 (compare Figures 4 and 6). Such results clearly
show that novices and experts use different mental
strategies to reason clinical cases because the EEG ac-
tivity is modulated by the number of years of clinical
experience. Although the literature [9,11] on clinical
reasoning have already raised the hypothesis that nov-
ices and experts use different reasoning strategies, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
provide empirical support for this hypotheses.
In a recent study Melo et al. [12] designed a very spe-
cific fMRI protocol to analyze pattern recognition in
clinical diagnosis and proposed the hypothesis that doc-
tors recognize XR signals through lexical-semantic asso-
ciations. Here, we show that clinical diagnosis is a much
more complex process, which includes pattern recogni-
tion (as in XR signal identification) and analogical or
analytical reasoning.
Conclusions
Summarizing the above conclusions, we propose that
the volunteers in this study used the information ob-
tained from the clinical history to trigger one or
more diagnostic hypotheses and then used these hy-
potheses to recall X-ray information from memory.
They ultimately used this recalled information to
make decisions about X-rays in their daily clinical
practices. Uncertainty about the identification of both
the clinical and XR data and the prevalence of these
pieces of information was used to calculate the hy-
pothesis plausibility. In this context, we may conclude
the following:
1. PCA analysis was successful in disclosing the
different patterns of brain activity associated with
hypothesis triggering and handling (pattern P1);
identification uncertainty and prevalence assessment
(pattern P3), and hypothesis plausibility calculation
(pattern P2);
2. Logistic regression analysis was successful in
disclosing the brain activity associated with clinical
reasoning success, and together with
3. Regression analysis showed that clinical practice
reorganizes the neural circuits supporting clinical
reasoning.
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